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Abstract:  Turkey has experienced high and persistent inflation for more than twenty years. 
This chapter attempts firstly to survey the extremely broad literature on theories 
of inflation, in order to be able to classify, understand and discuss the dynamics 
of inflation more carefully. In this chapter, it is mainly argued that inflation may 
be interpreted as a net result of sophisticated and continuous interactions of 
demand-side (or monetary) shocks, supply-side (or real) shocks, price-adjustment 
(or inertial) factors and political processes (or institutional factors). The second 
aim of the chapter is to compare the existing empirical studies on Turkish 
inflation, by considering their sample period, data frequency, empirical methods, 
modeled macroeconomic variables and main results. Most of the studies reviewed 
here seem to have focused primarily on demand-side determinants (e.g., monetary 
growth and budget deficits), and partially on some supply-side factors (e.g., 
nominal exchange rates and oil prices). On the other hand, the components, 
degree and effects of inflation inertia need to be investigated in more detail. In the 
future, the modeling attempts of the inflationary dynamics in Turkey would profit 
from the so-called “new political macroeconomics” because the role of the 
political process and institutions is not a weak explanatory factor of Turkish 
inflation. 
1. Introduction 
High and persistent inflation has been a major characteristic of the Turkish 
economy for more than two decades (see Figure 1), and several disinflation 
attempts since 1980 seem to have failed. There exists still a number of 
potential causes for ongoing inflationary process. 
In Turkey, it is commonly argued that sustainability of high and 
persistent inflation rates since the late 1970s has been “fed” by: 
(1)  high public sector budget deficits, 
(2)  monetization of public sector budget deficits, 44  Inflation and Disinflation in Turkey 
 
(3)  massive infrastructure investments of the various governments, such as 
for the Southeastern Anatolian Project, 
(4)  high military expenditures associated with geopolitical reasons, 
(5) political instability which results in inflationary pressures due to 
populist policies that have ensued prior to each general election, 
(6)  persistent inflationary expectations of economic agents, 
(7)  inflationary effects of changes in exchange rates via increases in prices 
of imported inputs, 
(8) occasional increases in world prices of major imported inputs 
(particularly, crude-oil), 
(9) increases in regulated prices of public sector products which are 
mainly used as input by the domestic private sector, and/or 
(10)  rising interest rates resulting from the crowding-out effect of public 

























Figure 1: Inflation in Turkey (annual percent changes in the GDP deflator, 1951–2001) 
Source: State Institute of Statistics and State Planning Organization; author’s own 
calculations. 
   Causes of Inflation in Turkey  45 
 
In reality, however, most of these “possible” causes discussed publicly may 
be condensed into a smaller number of determinants in order to better 
understand the dynamics of inflation in Turkey. There are many reasons to 
do so. First of all, some of these factors are closely interrelated, or may be 
seen as stemming from the same macroeconomic category. Some other 
factors cannot be accepted as real causes of inflation if we consider the 
relevant debates in the theory. Furthermore, to be able to propose a 
successful disinflation program, one should rank these broader factors 
according to their relative importance. Given the current focus on 
disinflation in Turkey, it seems very timely to survey both the main 
developments in inflation theories and the empirical studies on sources of 
inflation in Turkey. This type of a study may also be illuminating for the 
formation of a new agenda for future research on analyzing the current 
dynamics of inflation and/or disinflation in Turkey. 
In this chapter, I mainly attempt selectively to review the existing large 
body of empirical literature on causes of Turkish inflation. Since every 
empirical study must be based on a theoretical background, I firstly present 
a brief history of theories of inflation in Section 2. Following this review of 
competing or complementary theories of inflation, in Section 3, I compare 
selected empirical studies of Turkish inflation in terms of their sample 
period, data frequency, empirical methods, modeled macroeconomic 
variables, and main results. Finally, Section 4 is devoted both to 
summarizing the main conclusions of the survey and to discussing briefly 
possible directions of further research with special reference to recent 
developments in inflation theory. 
Note that the emphasis in this study will be, in general, on “causes” of 
inflation rather than on possible “costs and cures” of inflation. That is to 
say, a number of highly relevant topics, such as disinflation, core inflation, 
inflation targeting, policy credibility and inflation variability, remain 
outside the framework of the present study. 
2.  A Brief History of Inflation Theories 
Inflation is usually defined as sustained increases in the general price level 
for goods and services in an economy. Note that this definition excludes 
clearly one-time increases in the price level.
1 If equilibrium price level in a 
domestic market for goods and services rises continuously as a result of 
continued excess demand conditions in successive time periods, then 
economists speak in general from demand-pull inflation. In this case 46  Inflation and Disinflation in Turkey 
 
aggregate demand grows faster than the level of aggregate supply and 
“pulls” prices higher. But if firms’ costs increase continuously as in the 
cases of rising wages, interest rates, taxes, imported input prices, or 
exchange rates, then some economists prefer to use the term cost-push 
inflation to describe this phenomenon. 
In practice, however, it is not always easy to decompose the observed 
inflation into its demand-pull and cost-push components. The process is 
dynamic, and the shocks to prices are mixed. Furthermore, inflation itself, 
or inertia in inflation, may also cause future inflation. Finally, some 
theories include both demand-side and supply-side channels of feedback in 
explaining inflation. Therefore, we need other criteria, besides demand-pull 
and cost-push, to classify theories of inflation. There are many alternative 
possibilities to distinguish various types of inflation theories. For example, 
we may differentiate between short-run vs. long-run inflation theories, 
closed vs. open economy models of inflation, theories of low-, high- or 
hyper-inflation, perfect competition (market-clearing) vs. imperfect 
(monopolistic) competition models, theories with assumptions of perfect or 
imperfect information, fiscal vs. monetary theories of inflation, etc. For the 
purposes of the present study, it seems to me more appropriate to classify 
and compare theories of inflation according to major debates between 
competing schools of economics in a more or less chronological order.
2 
This section ends with a four-blocked categorization of the causes of 
inflation. 
2.1 Monetary vs. Keynesian Inflation Theories 
Classical (e.g., David Hume, Adam Smith, David Ricardo and John Stuart 
Mill) and neoclassical (e.g., Leon Walras, Alfred Marshall and Arthur C. 
Pigou) economists all used mainly the so-called quantity theory of money 
(QTM) to explain inflation. In its transactions version, the QTM states that 
the value of all sales of goods must necessarily equal the value of all 
purchases: 
T P V M ⋅ = ⋅  (1) 
where M is money supply, V is the velocity of money, P is the general price 
level, and T represents the real volume of transactions. In this framework, 
aggregate supply in the goods market is given while aggregate demand is 
defined as follows:   Causes of Inflation in Turkey  47 
 
T AS = . (2) 
P V M AD / ) ( ⋅ = . (3) 
Now, T may be interpreted to represent real output which is determined 
according to the production function in the long run. Equilibrium in the 
goods market requires here that AS = AD, and hence, 
P V M T / ) ( ⋅ = . (4) 
If one assumes, following the classical economists, that V and T are 
constant in the short run, the transactions equation in (4) can be rewritten to 
yield a price equation for the economy as follows: 
M T V P ⋅ = ) / ( . (5a) 
Equation (5a) states simply that doubling the money supply doubles 
ceteris paribus the price level. That is, the general price level is solely an 
increasing function of money supply, or in other words, an excess supply in 
the money market causes, other things being equal, an excess demand in 
the goods market. It should be added that the relative version of the 
equation (5a) can simply be interpreted as the inflation equation of the 
QTM: 
m g v + − ≈ π ) (  (5b) 
where π, v, g and m represent the percentage changes in P, V, T, and M, 
respectively, while v and g are assumed to be zero. 
In its extreme interpretation, this simple classical or neoclassical 
relationship states that inflation is only a monetary phenomenon if one 
ignores the possible changes in V and T. Therefore, in a classical or 
neoclassical economy, the money supply should be reduced to fight against 
inflation.  
O’Brien (1975) argues that there are some differences between 
transmission mechanisms in classical and neoclassical versions of the 
QTM. The neoclassical model is based on the assumption of full 
employment, and it is characterized by a dichotomy between the real and 
monetary sectors. Real wages will be determined in the real sector (labor 48  Inflation and Disinflation in Turkey 
 
market) while nominal prices are a function of the money supply. 
Therefore, increases in the money supply increase the general price level by 
leaving the volumes of goods demanded and supplied, and hence, real 
output unchanged. On the other hand, O’Brien writes, some classical 
economists like David Hume do not assume full employment and there is 
no room for a dichotomy. According to Hume, an increase in the money 
supply does increase the general price level through a different 
transmission mechanism. The increase in nominal cash balances of 
economic units initially results in higher expenditures for goods, and hence, 
in higher production. Then, under the assumption of underemployment, 
prices start to adjust to risen money supply. As a result, money is not 
neutral as in the neoclassical model; it has also some real effects in the 
short run. In other words, Hume’s monetary approach differs in describing 
the process of inflation in the short and long run by allowing to some price 
rigidities in the short run. 
John Maynard Keynes’ (1936) revolutionary book, The General Theory 
of Employment, Interest and Money, was based mainly on the assumption 
of underemployment equilibrium with a fixed general price level. That is, it 
was not designed to analyze the dynamics of inflation. As an alternative to 
monetary model of inflation, Keynes (1940) developed a different demand-
side model of inflation with price rigidities mainly in the labor market. In 
his model of “inflation gap”, Keynes describes a redistribution process in 
which “inflation acts like a pump that transfers income from wage earners 
who have a low propensity to save and a low marginal tax rate to the 
entrepreneurial sector with a higher propensity to save and a higher 
marginal tax rate” (Frisch, 1983: 230). An unexpected increase in aggregate 
demand (inflationary gap), as in the case of a war, leads to a price increase 
under full employment conditions, and this, in turn, creates unanticipated 
profits for firms while nominal wages remain temporarily constant. Rising 
profits create an additional excess demand in the goods market. However, 
the lagged attempt of firms to satisfy the initial excess demand in the goods 
market creates an excess demand in the labor market. Resulting 
competition among entrepreneurs for fully employed labor pushes nominal 
wages higher until restoring real wages to their initial level. The increase in 
real wages induces a new demand pressure in the goods market. Prices 
increase again. If the wage-lag mechanism still continues to work, an 
inflation spiral occurs which can be defeated only by reducing aggregate 
demand (e.g., tax increases and/or cuts in government spending) and/or 
reducing rigidities by, for example, implementing an appropriate income 
policy.   Causes of Inflation in Turkey  49 
 
2.2  Neo-Keynesian vs. Monetarist Approach to Inflation: The Philips-
Curve Debate 
Keynes’ (1940) inflationary gap model was mainly a demand-side model 
with wage rigidities in the short-run but without any explicit remarks about 
the money market developments as in the QTM. Furthermore, his non-
monetary, demand-pull approach to inflation was influenced also by some 
cost-push arguments for inflation, even in his some earlier studies as 
mentioned by Humphrey (1981). In spite of accepting the possibility of 
inflationary effects originating from supply-side shocks, most Keynesian 
economists such as A. Smithies, G. Ackley, S. Maital and J. A. Trevithhick 
treated demand-side shocks as the primary cause of inflation. Arthur 
Smithies (1942) and the others formalized Keynes’ verbal analysis of 
inflationary gap and their explanations prevailed until the mid-1970s. In 
Section 2.3, I will return to the Keynes-Smithies line of theories with 
special emphasis on the role of distributional effects in the process of 
inflation when summarizing the cost-push theories of inflation developed 
by structuralists, post-Keynesians, disequilibrium economists and neo-
Marxian economists. 
The Neo-Keynesian macroeconomics, or so-called Keynesian 
neoclassical synthesis, is based primarily on 
(1) the IS-LM closed-economy model developed mainly by John R. Hicks 
and Franco Modigliani in the late 1930s and 1940s, 
(2) the Phillips curve developed by Alban W. Phillips and Richard Lipsey 
in the late 1950s, and popularized by Paul Samuelson and Robert Solow 
in the early 1960s,
3 and 
(3) the  Fleming-Mundell (F-M) small-open-economy model developed in 
the 1960s.
4 
The proposed income redistribution mechanism, which fed sustainable 
price increases in the Keynes-Smithies model, was not included in the 
standard IS-LM context. That is, there was no room for continuous price 
increases, or inflation, in the neo-Keynesian IS-LM world. On the other 
hand, the difference between Keynesian and classical theories of income 
determination was reduced to differences in interest-rate sensitivity of 
money demand, and hence, to the shape of the curve for money market 
equilibrium (LM). Therefore, the Keynesian neoclassical synthesis 
incorporated labor market dynamics into the IS-LM model by taking into 
account the so-called Phillips curve (PC) to eliminate the missing 
wage/price block, or inflation equation, in the system: 50  Inflation and Disinflation in Turkey 
 
U ⋅ α = π  (6a) 
where π represents the inflation rate and U is the unemployment rate. The 
trade-off, or negative correlation, between inflation and unemployment was 
stated by α < 0. That is, the higher the inflation rate the lower is the 
unemployment rate, and vice versa. Furthermore, an increase in the inverse 
of U, or simply a decrease in U, was interpreted as an indication for excess 
demand in labor and hence in goods markets, following the tradition of the 
demand-pull explanation for inflation. 
The demand-side determination of inflation within the IS-LM-PC 
framework, however, failed to explain stagflation in the late 1960s and 
1970s. Particularly, the dramatic oil-price shocks in 1973–74 and 1978–79 
created worldwide recessionary and cost-push inflationary effects at the 
same time. The observed evidence on incompatibility between the PC 
relationship and the co-existence of stagnation and inflation was actually 
predicted by monetarist economists such as Milton Friedman and Edmund 
Phelps who proposed a so-called expectations-augmented PC in the late 
1960s: 
e U π ⋅ β + ⋅ α = π  (6b) 
where  π
e is inflation expectations while β represents the expectation 
adjustment parameter. In the short-run, there is still a negative relationship 
between inflation and unemployment for a given π
e. That is, inflation 
expectations act as a shift variable in the model. However, assuming that 
β=1 and π
e = π in the long-run, the PC must be vertical according to the 
monetarist critique of the standard PC. In other words, there is no trade-off 
between π and U in the long run, and the vertical long-run PC represents a 
kind of “natural rate of unemployment”. 
According to the monetarist economists, the formation of inflation 
expectations is backward-looking, or adaptive, in the sense that not all 





t 1 1 ) 1 ( − − π ⋅ λ − + π ⋅ λ = π  (7) 
where λ and (1-λ) are the adjustment parameters, or weights. Here, equation 
(7) states that the expected rate of inflation at time t is only a weighted 
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previous period. This equation, which shows how expectations are formed, 
is interpreted by many economists as an appropriate measure of inflation 
inertia.
5 Notice that the concept of backward-looking, or less informed, 
expectations is also used by Phillip Cagan (1956) as a major determinant of 
money demand in his famous analysis of hyperinflation.
6 
2.3 Monetarist-Structuralist Debate: Demand-Pull vs. Cost-Push Inflation 
The discussions on causes of inflation in the 1960s and early 1970s were 
dominated by the debate between the monetarists and structuralists as to 
whether inflation is a demand-pull or cost-push issue. 
Cost-push theories of inflation largely attribute inflation and disinflation 
to non-monetary, supply-side effects that change the unit-cost and profit-
markup components of the prices of individual products (Humphrey, 1998). 
The structuralist approach to inflation is one of the major versions of the 
cost-inflation theories. The idea linking inflation to country-specific 
structural factors, such as the coexistence of a “progressive” (industrial) 
sector and a “traditional” (agricultural or the export) sector, dates back to 
the influential studies of Streeten (1962) and Baumol (1967).
7 The first-
generation of structuralist inflation models developed in the 1960s 
explained Latin American inflation with the productivity differences 
between the industrial and agricultural sectors. In general, they argued that 
the traditional sector responds to monetary, or aggregate-demand, shocks 
with a lag. This lag is accompanied by a partial increase in industrial output 
and employment in the short run, which in turn increases wages and hence 
the demand for agricultural products. This increase implicates a change in 
relative prices in favor of foodstuffs. Higher agricultural prices lead to 
higher wage demands in this sector. Increasing wages increase the demand 
for industrial products, and the mechanism continues to work. In this 
model, aggregate supply chronically lags behind aggregate demand as a 
result of the temporary output rigidities in one of the sectors. Therefore, the 
structuralist model is accepted as a cost-push theory. 
In the 1970s, the so-called Scandinavian model of inflation
8 was one of 
the popular versions of the structuralist approach. A special feature of the 
sophisticated Scandinavian theory is that wages in Scandinavian countries 
such as Norway and Sweden are set through nationally supervised 
collective bargaining from which nearly uniform wage increases for all 
union workers emerge: 
Wages rise in the more progressive and profitable industries, which can afford to pay 
more and prefer to do so rather than lower prices or announce higher profits, which 52  Inflation and Disinflation in Turkey 
 
would invite public criticism and eventually the entry of competitive firms; the wage 
increases are next extended to the less progressive and profitable industries; the latter 
must raise their prices since their low profits make it impossible to absorb the costs; 
important components of the cost of living, such as rents, thus move up; the wage 
earners who had made the first gains find that they need a catch-up to hold their 
previous advantage in terms of purchasing power; and the spiral continues. (Whitney, 
1982: 80) 
The so-called post-Keynesian theory of inflation developed particularly 
in the 1970s,
9 and the short-lived disequilibrium economics in the tradition 
of Don Patinkin and Axel Leijonhufvud provided other well-known types 
of cost-push theories of inflation with a special emphasize on the role of 
markup pricing, income claims, and relative price changes. It should be 
added that some variants of the neo-Marxian and Latin American neo-
structuralist inflation theories are still based on the idea of the cost-push 
inflation, which stems from similar distributional conflicts.
10 
Keynesian, structuralist, post-Keynesian, and neo-Marxian versions of 
cost-push theories seem to have similar distributional mechanisms which 
imply changes in relative prices, and which produce continuous increases in 
the general price level, i.e., a sustainable inflationary process. Nevertheless, 
another group of the supply-side theories of inflation intends to explain 
only a one-time increase in the price level caused by an exogenous shock 
such as an oil-price shock and/or devaluation of the national currency. The 
“imported inflation thesis” which is based on one-time shocks, however, 
cannot explain inflation because it does not include a “mechanism”, which 
can produce sustained price increases in an open economy. The temporary 
nature of most of the oil-price shocks allows only transitory changes in 
relative prices, output, and employment, while leading to a one-time 
pressure on general price level.
 Nevertheless, it should be noted that, in the 
literature, there are also some sophisticated modeling attempts proposing 
alternative mechanisms in which, for instance, the causation runs from 
exchange-rate depreciations or balance-of-payments crises to inflation 
through increases in inflationary expectations, government deficits and/or 
the money supply.
11 
The modern QTM in the tradition of Milton Friedman accepts that the 
inflation occurs when the rate of growth of the money supply exceeds the 
growth rate of the real aggregate output in the economy. According to the 
monetarists, the QTM implies that inflation is always, everywhere and 
solely a monetary and demand-side phenomenon. In their view, cost-push 
arguments for inflation are misleading because they primarily are based on 
some microeconomic observations on the supply-side. Monetarists believe 
in general that the firm- or industry-specific cost increases cannot be   Causes of Inflation in Turkey  53 
 
inflationary as long as they are not related to, or accommodated by, 
increases in the money supply. Thus, the causation runs from inflation to 
costs, and not vice versa. 
2.4  Rational Expectations Revolution: Forward vs. Backward Looking 
Expectations 
Macroeconomics in the 1970s is dominated by a revolutionary idea of the 
so-called Rational Expectations (RE) economists, such as Robert E. Lucas, 
Thomas J. Sargent, Neil Wallace, Robert J. Barro and Bennett T. 
McCallum. Starting with the monetarist assumptions of continuous market-
clearing and imperfect information, the RE school, or the first generation of 
the new classical macroeconomics, argued that people do not consistently 
make the same forecasting errors as suggested in the adaptive expectations 
idea: Economic agents form their macroeconomic expectations “rationally” 
based on all past and current relevant information available, and not only 
on past information as in the case of backwards-looking, or adaptive, price 
expectations. According to the traditional monetarist approach from the 
1960s, the errors in price expectations were related to each other. Here, 
however, they are totally random, or independent of each other. 
The RE approach to the business cycle and prices generated a vertical 
PC both for the short- and the long-run. If the monetary authority 
announces a monetary stimulus in advance, people expect that prices rise. 
In this case, this fully anticipated monetary policy cannot have any real 
effects even in the short-run as argued by monetarists. Thus, the central 
bank can affect the real output and employment only if it can find a way to 
create a “price surprise”. Otherwise, the “forward-looking” expectation 
adjustments of economic agents will ensure that their pre-announced policy 
fails. Similarly, if a policymaker announces a disinflation policy in 
advance, this policy cannot reduce prices if people do not believe that the 
government will really carry it out. That is, in the new classical framework, 
price expectations are closely related to the necessity of policy credibility 
and reputation for successfully disinflating the economy. 
According to monetarist and new classical economists, the growth in the 
money supply stems typically from the ongoing public sector deficits that 
are primarily financed by the central bank. In the “unpleasant monetarist 
framework” presented by Sargent and Wallace (1981), the government 
budget constraint is essential to understanding the time path of inflation.
12 
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determine the timing of unavoidable inflation in the future, under the 
assumption that fiscal policy dominates monetary policy.
13 
2.5 New Keynesian vs. New Classical Economics 
In the 1980s, the second generation of the new classical macroeconomists 
such as Edward C. Prescott, Finn E. Kydland and Charles I. Plosser argued 
that upswings and downswings in economic activity originate from real (or 
aggregate supply) shocks rather than monetary (or aggregate demand) 
shocks. Assuming that the aggregate demand curve is fixed, and by keeping 
the assumptions of continuous market-clearing, imperfect information, and 
rationality of expectations, the so-called real business cycle (RBC) theorists 
investigate the effects of supply shocks (e.g., process and production 
innovations, discovery of new sources of raw materials, changes in relative 
prices of foods and energy, bad weather, and nominal effective exchange 
rate changes) on the business cycle. 
To a large extent, RBC theorists do not attempt explicitly to explain 
price level changes or inflation; rather, they focus particularly on real-
output effects of adverse, or negative, supply shocks such as deviations of 
factor productivity from trend or relative price changes caused by oil price 
shocks. However, one can easily argue that the main contribution of RBC 
economists is that they call our attention to the possibility of the important 
role of supply shocks in explaining inflation. In terms of the variables in 
equation (5b), that is, persistent and negative supply-shocks (g < 0) may 
cause inflation, assuming that v=m=0. This statement is, actually, also in 
accordance with the monetarist inflation explanation because m exceeds g 
even in this case. Note that RBC theory implies that persistent 
technological improvements may contribute significantly to the disinflation 
process in an inflationary environment. 
Assuming that all markets clear continuously due to speedy price and 
quantity adjustments, neoclassical, monetarist and new classical line of 
thinking about causes and cures of inflation mostly ignore the possibility of 
adjustment lags which may stem from rigidities in wages and prices in the 
short-run. Since the late 1970s, however, the new Keynesian economists, 
such as George Akerlof, Janet Yellen, Joseph E. Stiglitz, Robert J. Gordon, 
John B. Taylor, N. Gregory Mankiw, Guillermo Calvo, Olivier Blanchard 
and Julio Rotemberg, have investigated the possible microeconomic causes 
of these rigidities to eliminate the Keynesian “arbitrary” assumption of 
fixed wages and prices in the short run. The new Keynesian attack on the 
new classical macroeconomics is concentrated principally on the   Causes of Inflation in Turkey  55 
 
assumption of “continuous market-clearing”, accepting that inflation is still 
a monetary phenomenon in the long run. According to the new Keynesians, 
wage and price stickiness in the short run can be explained by factors like 
“small menu costs” or “staggered (or non-synchronized) wage and price 
changes”. For many firms, particularly under low inflation conditions, it 
may be costly to change their prices continuously as a response to each 
demand shock (see, for example, Mankiw, 1985). Another argument is that 
staggering may slow the process of general price (or wage) level 
adjustment, even when individual prices (or wages) change frequently.
14 
Obviously, the idea of price rigidities is not applicable to “auction 
markets” where prices change continuously. Its validity is apparently 
limited to some posted-price “customer markets” where prices of final 
products are more responsive to changes in the costs of intermediate inputs 
than they are to changes in aggregate demand (Taylor, 1998). Moreover, 
the possibility of intermittent or non-synchronized price and wage 
adjustments, as a source of an inertia generating mechanism under 
imperfect competition conditions in hyper- or high-inflation economies, 
significantly diminishes because, under such conditions, small menu costs 
do not matter, and the length of contracts dramatically shrinks. 
Nevertheless, rigidity arguments related to factors such as the overlapping 
degree of wage contracts may contribute to understanding the short-run 
dynamics of inflation even in these type of economies, particularly taken 
together with the notions that expectations may be formed economy-wide, 
may be forward- or backwards-looking, and may be accompanied by a lack 
of policy credibility. 
2.6 New Neoclassical Synthesis: Toward a Better Understanding of the 
Dynamics of Output and Price Fluctuations 
Since the early 1990s, the sharp difference between the emphasis of new 
Keynesian and new classical economists on the major origins of business 
cycles and price movements has been increasingly softening, and a new 
neoclassical synthesis (NNS) is now on the agenda of macroeconomics.
15 
According to Goodfriend and King (1997), the new generation of 
quantitative models of economic fluctuations has two central elements: 
(1) systematic application of intertemporal optimization behavior of firms 
and households, and rational expectations, and 
(2)  incorporation of imperfect competition and costly short-run price 
adjustments into dynamic macroeconomics. 56  Inflation and Disinflation in Turkey 
 
In the NNS, monetary, or demand, shocks are a key determinant of 
business cycles, as a result of the incorporated new Keynesian assumption 
of price stickiness in the short run. At the same time, however, the NNS 
assigns a potentially large function to supply shocks, such as changes in 
productivity, changes in tax policy or relative price shocks, in explaining 
real economic activity, as suggested in the new classical RBC theory.
16 The 
highly complex models of the NNS allow that Keynesian and RBC 
mechanisms operate through somewhat different channels. The so-called 
new IS-LM-PC version of the NNS makes the price level an endogenous 
variable. The NNS also views expectations as critical to the inflation 
process, but accepts expectations as amenable to management by a 
monetary policy rule.
17 King (2000: 87) summarizes: 
The distinguishing characteristic of the New IS-LM model is that its key behavioral 
relations can be derived from underlying choice problem of households and firms and 
that these relations consequently involve expectations about the future in a central 
manner. The IS curve relates expected output growth to the real interest rate, which is a 
central implication of the modern theory of consumption. The aggregate supply/Phillips 
curve component of the model relates inflation today to expected future inflation and 
output gap. This relationship can be derived from a monopoly pricing decision that is 
constrained by stochastic opportunities for price adjustment together with a consistent 
definition of the price level. 
2.7 New Political Macroeconomics of Inflation 
The theories reviewed so far focus mainly on macroeconomic determinants 
of inflation (e.g., monetary and real shocks, and inertia in inflation) and 
simply ignore the role of non-economic factors such as institutions, 
political process and culture in the creation or acceleration process of 
inflation. They also overlook the possibility that sustained government 
deficits, as a potential cause for inflation, may be partially or fully 
endogenized by considering the effects of the political process and possible 
lobbying activities on government budgets, and thus, on inflation. 
The so-called new political economy is the study of how the political 
nature of decision-making affects policy choices and, ultimately, economic 
outcomes.
18 That is to say,  
(…) in the real world, economic policy is not chosen by the social planner who safely 
inhabits economics textbooks, sheltered from agents with conflicting interests while he 
calculates optimal policy. Economic policy is the result of a decision process that 
balances conflicting interests so that a collective choice may emerge. (…) In order to 
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we must therefore begin with some political and economic building blocks. (Drazen, 
2000: 20) 
Therefore, the new political economy literature provides fresh 
perspectives on the relations between timing of elections, policymaker 
performance, political instability, policy credibility and reputation, central 
bank independence and the inflation process itself. 
2.8 Summing Up: On Classifying the Possible Determinants of Inflation 
The economy-wide price-level is the relative price of goods and services in 
terms of money, as implied in the definition of inflation in the first sentence 
of this section. Therefore, inflation must be a phenomenon that results from 
the interaction of monetary (demand-side) and real (supply-side) factors.
19 
The primary source of shocks in the demand-side is seen commonly as 
sustained public sector deficits. Modeling the role of government deficits 
and their financing methods is one of the major challenges faced by 
economists. The modification of an inflation model to allow for feedbacks, 
or “eroding” effects, from the inflation to the real value of government 
revenues due to the existence of tax-collection lags (Olivera-Tanzi effect),
20 
and/or to the real value of the government’s liabilities (inflation tax), leads 
to an increase in the complexity of the structure of the proposed model.  
The study of inflationary effects stemming from real shocks is closely 
related to the economics of technology, long-run growth theory, and theory 
of exchange-rate determination, since they arise in the form of, e.g., 
negative productivity shocks, stagflationary relative-price shocks related to 
imported raw materials, or depreciations in the domestic currency. 
But, this is not the whole story. The time path of prices may also be 
influenced by the expectations, stickiness of prices/wages, and possible 
indexation experiences in the economy. Therefore, these inertial factors 
should be considered as a third block of explanatory factors of inflation.
21  
The last block of explanatory factors of inflation seems to be offered by 
the new political macroeconomics. To model the dynamics of inflation 
more realistically, the political process, or the role of institutions, must also 
be considered explicitly. Most of the theoretical discussions on causes of 
inflation above are based on the assumption that financial markets are 
highly developed and functioning very well in the presence of necessary 
laws and rules. However, this is not the case in many high-inflation 
developing countries. Thus, the political or institutional approach to 
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political and cultural changes in such economies, and modify the model to 
explain high-inflation accordingly. 
In my view, as a conclusion, the complex and dynamic interactions of 
four groups of factors (i.e., demand shocks, supply shocks, inertial factors 
and the political process) come together to explain inflation in any 
economy. 
3.  Empirical Studies on Turkish Inflation 
After reviewing the theoretical discussions on causes of inflation in the 
previous section, I attempt now to survey the large empirical literature on 
determinants of inflation in Turkey. This survey is limited to those 
empirical studies that investigate explicitly the sources of Turkish inflation 
while the plentiful contributions on disinflation processes are consciously 
excluded.
22 
This section is divided into two subsections to discuss the evidence on 
the causes and dynamics of pre-1980 and post-1979 inflations separately. 
There are many reasons for this. First, Turkey experienced a radical 
structural change in the 1980s, as discussed more fully by Ertuğrul and 
Selçuk in Chapter 2 in this book. Second, the world economy was 
characterized by two major oil-price shocks in the 1970s, but stagflationary 
effects of oil-price shocks weakened in the last two decades. In addition, 
developments in econometrics and time series techniques accelerated since 
the early 1980s while the computing possibilities dramatically improved 
within the same period. 
3.1 Empirical Evidence on Dynamics of Inflation Prior to 1980 
Turkey experienced a short period of high inflation in the second half of the 
1950s but the history of today’s high and persistent inflation goes back to 
the first half of the 1970s at the earliest (see also Figure 1 above). The 
acceleration of inflation after 1953 is explained by the fact that the money 
supply started to grow faster than real output (Fry, 1980) while the decade 
of the 1970s is characterized by both the frequent devaluations of the 
Turkish lira, and the stagflationary effects of two major oil price shocks in 
1973–74 and 1978–79. 
To my knowledge, Akyüz (1973) is the first analytical attempt to study 
the causes and dynamics of inflation in Turkey. For the 1950–68 period, he 
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a combined “adaptive expectations - demand for money” model, and 
concludes that inflation is not self-generating, and it can be explained by 
the present and past changes in the money supply, real income, and the 
non-monetization ratio. His further analysis shows that the monetary 
growth in Turkey is largely attributable to the expansion in the monetary 
base, which in turn is closely related to the agricultural price policies 
followed by the government through the State Economic Enterprises in the 
mid 1950s. He stresses that the political reason for these economic policies 
was the populist tendency of the first elected government after the 
transition to a multi-party parliamentary system in 1950. 
Ertuğrul’s (1982) comprehensive study departs from the statistical 
analysis of causality between money and prices prior to 1980. The author 
develops then step-by-step a self-generating inflation model with six 
equations which is based on the statistical endogenity of money supply and 
on the assumption of adaptive inflation expectations in Turkey. Notice that 
he models government deficits as a function of relative agricultural support 
prices. Ertuğrul’s macroeconometric simultaneous-system estimations 
based on deseasonalized quarterly data for 1970–78 show that increases in 
real income have a remarkable negative effect on the general price level. 
He concludes that inflationary expectations variable is the major 
determinant of inflation in Turkey. 
Aksoy (1982), on the other hand, aims to test the monetarist and 
structuralist theories of inflation by using Turkish annual data for the period 
of 1950–79. He mainly concludes that the relationship between the money 
supply and prices is not proportional, but depends on both the inflationary 
expectations and the nature of foreign exchange availability. Furthermore, 
he finds little evidence on the cost-push effects of relative prices, i.e. the 
relative price shocks work through the money supply mechanism rather 
than creating cost-push pressures. 
In the late 1970s, two major phenomena seem to contribute substantially 
to the increase in inflationary pressure in the financially-repressed Turkish 
economy: first, the fast domestic credit expansion, particularly to 
government and public sector enterprises, and second, the sharp recession 
caused by the foreign exchange shortage, which in turn stemmed from two 
oil-price shocks. After his analysis using quarterly data for 1962–77, Levy 
(1981: 370) adds: 
Since the prices of oil and other raw materials are still rising, Turkey’s terms of trade 
can be expected to deteriorate further. In order to ease the adjustment of the economy 
to the higher world price of petroleum and raw materials, their domestic prices must be 
increased. Although political and social pressures do not make this an easy task, 
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Fund have recently forces the Turkish government to announce an increase in the price 
of oil and oil products. [Italics are added.] 
Finally, using annual data to estimate a simple model for the demand for 
money, Togan (1987) reports that the time path of money and interest rate 
determined the movements in the rate of inflation from 1960 to 1983. 
3.2 Sources of Inflation in the 1980s and 1990s 
There is a much larger literature focusing on specific aspects of post-1979 
inflation in Turkey. The sharp acceleration of inflation in 1980 and the 
increased availability of statistical data for shorter frequencies after 1980 
appear to have contributed to this enrichment in the empirical literature. 
Table 1 presents a detailed comparison of selected empirical studies on 
the sources of sustained inflation from 1980 to today in Turkey. The 
empirical studies reviewed here differ unsurprisingly in their sample 
period, structure, methods, and hence, in their conclusions. 
For many authors, Öniş and Özmucur (1990) is a common starting point 
to survey the studies on causes of Turkish inflation after 1979. Using 
monthly data from 1981–87, Öniş and Özmucur (1990) explore inflationary 
dynamics in Turkey. The authors reject a pure monetary explanation of 
inflation based on a vector-autoregression analysis (VAR) and a 
simultaneous equation model. They find that devaluations of the Turkish 
lira have a strong impact on domestic inflation while supply-side factors 
seem to have in general significant effects on inflation. Rittenberg (1993) 
argues contrarily that Granger causality tests show that causality runs from 
price level changes to exchange rate changes but that there is not feedback 
causality in the opposite direction. 
Yeldan (1993) analyzes the political economy of inflation and 
disinflation in Turkey, by focusing particularly on distributional and 
structural aspects. His computable general equilibrium analysis with some 
Keynesian features shows that public sector expenditures act as an 
important and strong source of demand-pull inflation in Turkey. 
Furthermore, the distributional conflicts among socio-economic classes 
have a direct impact on the formation of price movements in the 1980s. He 
observes that the profit/rent inflation, which is based on increases of 
monopolistic producer mark-ups over prime costs, has a relatively strong 
inflationary impact on the cost-side, as compared to wage inflation. Finally, 
Yeldan refers to devaluationist exchange-rate policy as a major source of 
imported inflation due to the import-dependent character of the Turkish 
industry.   Causes of Inflation in Turkey  61 
 
Metin (1995) concludes by using a broader data set with annual and 
quarterly frequencies that fiscal expansion dominated the determination of 
Turkish inflation from 1950 to 1988. Excess money demand influences 
inflation positively in the short run. That is, to reduce inflation successfully, 
governments have to eliminate public sector budget deficits. Furthermore, 
devaluations also have some inflationary effects. İnsel (1995), Erol and van 
Wijnbergen (1997), Lim and Papi (1997), Agénor and Hoffmaister (1997), 
Darrat (1997) and Akyürek (1999) also provide results supporting the 
inflationary effects of depreciations. For many authors, this conclusion 
implicates the necessity to design an exchange-rate-based stabilization 
program to reduce the inflation in Turkey. 
In 1984, domestic citizens were allowed to open foreign exchange 
deposit (FED) accounts in Turkish banks. The subsequent increase in FED-
accounts to money-supply ratio after 1984 may be interpreted as a gross 
indication of rising currency substitution in Turkey. The capital account 
liberalization in 1989 also seems to have contributed to this development. 
In the presence of strong currency substitution, it is theoretically expected 
that the exchange rate instability significantly increases and that the 
government’s ability to collect seigniorage revenue is limited. Currency 
substitution, which may create inflationary effects by reducing the 
seigniorage revenue of the government, is closely related to the credibility 
of economic policies or inflation expectations. If, for example, economic 
agents perceive that the government will pursue a lax fiscal policy, then 
they flee from domestic currency to avoid future inflation tax. In this case, 
both the money demand and the exchange rate become unstable. The 
effects of currency substitution on exchange rate instability and 
seigniorage-maximizing rate of inflation in Turkey are empirically 
investigated by Selçuk (1994, 1997 and 2001), Scacciavillani (1995) and 
Akçay, Alper and Karasulu (1997). Scacciavillani (1995) mainly reports 
that the share of foreign currency holdings in liquid assets exhibits a strong 
and stable relationship with exchange rate fluctuations. Furthermore, he 
finds that the relationship between the inflation rate and currency 
substitution is statistically insignificant. Selçuk (2001), on the other hand, 
concludes that, as long as there is some degree of currency substitution in 
the economy, the Turkish government cannot collect more seigniorage 
revenue to finance budget deficits by simply setting the growth rate of 
monetary base at a higher level. 
In Turkey, it is common for politicians and bureaucrats to blame crude-
oil price increases for inflation. Özatay (1992), Kibritçioğlu and 
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the potential once-and-for-all price effects of increases in crude-oil and oil-
product prices. By using the 1990 input-output table for Turkey, 
Kibritçioğlu and Kibritçioğlu (1999) calculate that a hypothetical 20% 
increase in the dollar price of imported crude-oil leads to a cumulative 
increase in the general price level of only 1.1% within ten months. 
Furthermore, they estimate that a 20% increase in the nominal dollar price 
of the Turkish lira contributes to inflation in the amount of 2.8% within the 
same time frame. Finally, their VAR model estimations indicate the 
importance of both nominal exchange rate increases and past values of 
inflation itself as main determinants of inflation for the period 1986–98. 
The negligible role of a crude-oil price increase as a determinant of 
Turkish inflation may be explained principally by both the absence of a 
dynamic mechanism which generates continuous increases in the price 
level, and the gradually decreasing oil-dependency of many industries after 
1980 as in the rest of the world. But, the substantial swings in the crude-oil 
prices since the late 1980s are usually followed by fiscal-conditional 
increases in prices of oil-products in Turkey. Obviously, this phenomenon 
makes the analysis of net inflationary effects of crude-oil price increases 
more complicated. 
Recently, Akçay, Alper and Özmucur (1997), Lim and Papi (1997), 
Agénor and Hoffmaister (1997), Alper and Uçer (1998), Akyürek (1999), 
Cizre-Sakallıoğlu and Yeldan (1999), and Baum et al. (1999) have 
emphasized in particular the increasing role of inertia in the process of 
inflation in Turkey. Erlat (2001), for instance, states that both Turkish 
consumer and wholesale price indexes each have a significant long-run 
memory component. The expectational component of inflation inertia may 
result from the lack of credibility of government policies. Nonetheless, the 
degree and potential determinants of inertia as a whole should be 
investigated in more detail for Turkey. 
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shows that the time path of 
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determine the movements in 




















factors have significant effects 
on inflation in Turkey. 
Devaluations are strongly 
inflationary. A pure monetary 
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Public sector prices are 
generally not super-
exogenous because they stem 
from various big and 
infrequent shocks. Only prices 
of electrical energy, refinery 
products, and mining are 
strongly exogenous. Lending 
rates, agricultural prices, and 
import prices are also found 
as strongly exogenous. The 
responses of private 
manufacturing prices to such 
shocks are remarkably high 
and persistent. Hence, there is 
a considerable amount of 
inertia in the private sector 
prices. Wages seem to be 












rates, WPI and 
money supply for 
Turkey and 
trading partners 
Granger-causality runs from 
price level changes to 
exchange rate changes but 
there is not feedback 
causality. This conclusion is 
not altered by the inclusion or 
exclusion of the money 
supply variable. Thus, 
exchange rate adjustment does 
not seem to have created a 
vicious cycle of currency 
depreciation leading to 
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Public sector expenditures act 
as an important and strong 
source of demand-pull 
inflation in Turkey. The 
distributional conflicts among 
socio-economic classes have a 
direct impact on the formation 
of price movements in the 
1980s. The profit/rent 
inflation fed by increases in 
monopolistic producer mark-
ups over prime costs has a 
relatively strong impact on 
cost-push inflation. 
Devaluationist exchange-rate 
policy creates a remarkable 
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In the short run, the difference 
between the interest rate on 
money and the interest rate on 
loans has a fundamental role 
in controlling inflation in 
Turkey. The per-capita money 
supply affects the price level 
in the short run as well as in 
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the rate of interest 
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Turkish economy behaves 
consistent with predictions of 
a simple real business cycle 
model. Output follows an 
autoregressive structure with 
trend. Monetary policy is 
neutral. Elasticity between 
money and prices is unitary. 
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Excess demand in the 
government sector is the main 
determinant of inflation. The 
excess demand for money 
affects inflation positively but 
only in the short run. 
Imported inflation and the 
excess demand for assets in 
capital markets have some 
effect on consumer price 
inflation. There is no 
significant effect from the 
excess demand for goods. As 
a result, inflation could be 
reduced rapidly by 
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The public finance view of 
inflation is not supported. 
Monetization of public sector 
deficits is an important, but 
not the only reason for high 
inflation. Inflation in Turkey 
is mainly determined by 
exchange rate policy, real 








































Calculations with annual data 
show that a significant impact 
of budget deficits on inflation 
cannot be refuted under the 
assumption of long-run 
monetary neutrality. 
However, quarterly data 
implies a weakened link from 
other variables to inflation. 
The inertia in the inflation 
was increasing due to the 
accumulation of inflationary 
expectations in the period 
1987–95. The availability of 
bond financing after 1986 
might be the reason for the 
weakening causality from 
budget deficits to inflation to 
























The main transmission 
mechanism via which 
monetary and other policy 
instruments influence 
inflation in Turkey involves 
corporate sector activities. 
Both monetary and corporate 
sector factors are useful in 
underpinning Turkish 
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A real exchange rate policy 
based on the relative 
purchasing power parity rule 
caused moderate inflationary 
effects. Real exchange rate 
appreciations are 
contractionary for the 
demand-determined output 
case. Exchange rate policy 
can provide an anchor for 
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Monetary variables (initially 
money, and more recently the 
exchange rate) play a role in 
the inflationary process. 
Public sector deficits also 
contribute to inflationary 
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At short forecast horizons, 
historical shocks associated 
with inflation itself are the 
main factor explaining 
movements in inflation. 
Nominal exchange rate 
depreciation also plays a 
substantial role in the Turkish 
inflationary process. Wage 
shocks have relatively little 
inflationary impact. Monetary 
shocks have at best a tertiary 
importance in explaining 
movements in the rate of 
inflation. Finally, shocks 
resulting from changes in 
output gap are not important 











CPI, M1, a proxy 
for import prices, 
real GDP and 
nominal exchange 
rate 
Monetary growth is an 
important source of inflation 
in Turkey. The empirical 
results reveal also a 
significant effect of the 
depreciation of the Turkish 
Lira in provoking inflation in 
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base money, and 
general budget 
deficit 
The scaled budget deficit 
significantly affects inflation 
in Turkey. Real income 
growth and monetization of 
public sector deficits also 












CPI, WPI, M1, 
M2, M2Y and 
nominal exchange 
rate basket 
The empirical link between 
fiscal imbalances and inflation 
is weaker than one might 
think. Inflation has increased 
side-by-side with a visible 
erosion in TL-denominated 
monetary aggregates with 
seigniorage revenue 
somewhat declining. Inertia 
was what drives inflation in 
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By using the 1990 input-
output table for Turkey, the 
authors calculate that a 
hypothetical 20% increase in 
the dollar price of imported 
crude-oil causes a cumulative 
increase in the general price 
level only in the amount of 
1.1% within ten months. Most 
part of this effect occurs 
within the first two or three 
months after the oil-shock. 
The VAR model estimations 
indicate the importance both 
of nominal exchange rate 
increases and past values of 
inflation itself as main 
determinants of inflation for 












CPI, base money, 
nominal exchange 
rate and output 
Monetary and nominal 
exchange-rate shocks have 
been significant sources of 
inflation in Turkey. The 
results also indicate that 
inflation feeds itself. 
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CPI, WPI, private 
manufacturing 
producer prices 
and real exchange 
rates 
In Turkey, much of the 
behavior of price dynamics is 
governed by inertial 
expectations rather than shifts 
in the monetary variables such 














CPI  Long memory in the CPI-
based inflation rate is a 
general phenomenon also for 
Turkey. The persistence in 
inflation rates worldwide can 
arise from (1) the aggregation 
of constituent processes, each 
of which has short memory, 
(2) time-varying coefficient 
models or non-linear models, 














CPI and WPI  The monthly inflation rate is 
essentially stationary but has 
generally a significant long 
memory component. 2000–02 
disinflation and economic 
restructuring program of the 
government has to deal with a 
process which is mainly not 
non-stationary but has a 
strong long-memory 
component and will exhibit a 
great deal of resistance 
initially. However, if this 
policy is successful, would 
yield long-lived results. 
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oil prices, M1 and 
nominal exchange 
rate 
A major component of 
inflation in Turkey has been 
“aggregate demand-driven” or 
“core” inflation. Real oil 
price, supply and balance-of-
payments shocks had no 
significant effect on inflation 
while the real aggregate-
demand shocks, which 
stemmed from changes in the 
money stock and autonomous 
aggregate-demand, can be 
interpreted as a combined 
result of changes in high 
public sector budget deficits 
and devaluations of the TL. 
Finally, output is mainly 
explained by supply shocks 
within the model. 
 
Abbreviations: CPI: consumer price index; GDP: gross domestic product; GNP: gross national 
product; M1: narrow money supply; M2: broad money supply; M2Y: M2 plus foreign demand deposits, 
PSBR: public sector borrowing requirement, and WPI: wholesale price index. 
4. Concluding  Remarks 
Any attempt to survey the extremely broad literature on theories of inflation 
in merely a few pages is confronted with the risk of incompleteness and 
superficiality. However, this type of an effort may also be regarded as a 
necessary first step if one intends to organize, understand, model and 
explain the dynamics of inflation carefully. The theoretical survey in 
Section 2 yields, among other things, a four-blocked schematization of 
origins of inflation: Demand-side (or monetary) shocks, supply-side (or 
real) shocks, adjustment (or inertial) factors, and political processes (or the 
role of institutions). It appears that inflation is the net result of sophisticated 
dynamic interactions of these four groups of explanatory factors. That is to 
say, inflation is always and everywhere a macroeconomic and institutional 
phenomenon. 
The survey of the empirical studies in Section 3 on the dynamics of high 
and persistent inflation in Turkey shows that the existing modeling 
experiences seem to have focused mainly on demand-side factors, such as 70  Inflation and Disinflation in Turkey 
 
the money supply and government deficits. Some studies are limited solely 
to investigate the possible effects of one-time shocks, such as occasional 
increases in oil prices. However, the persistent nature of high inflation 
requires a more integrated framework to explore the dynamics of 
inflationary mechanism in Turkey. Therefore, the possible sources and the 
degree of inflation inertia need to be investigated further. The consideration 
of inertia in existing empirical studies is generally limited to the role of 
inflationary expectations. However, the study of the short-run adjustment 
dynamics of the general price level should also be examined further as 
attempted recently by Çağlayan and Filiztekin (2001). 
The role of the political process in explaining Turkish inflation has been 
in general ignored in empirical modeling efforts. To my knowledge, there 
are some political economy approaches to explain Turkish inflation (e.g., 
Öniş, 1997 and Özatay, 1999), but empirical studies in the tradition of new 
political economy are far from adequate. Recently, Ergun (2000) and Tutar 
and Tansel (2001) focus particularly on institutional and electoral 
determinants of government budget deficits in the country. Apparently, it is 
crucial to consider institutional explanatory factors in understanding the 
dynamics of inflation in Turkey. 
The ongoing high and persistent inflation in Turkey still offers to 
economists, political scientists, sociologists, and historians a good 
opportunity to investigate its causes and dynamics both empirically and in 
an interdisciplinary fashion. 
Notes 
 
*  The author thanks C. Emre Alper, Libby Rittenberg and Faruk Selçuk for their helpful 
comments on an earlier version of this chapter. The usual disclaimer applies. 
1  For many economists today, an adequate approach to explain the process of high and 
long-lasting increases in the general price level of goods and services requires a 
concentration on sources of core, or underlying, inflation, and not on changes in relative 
prices caused by factors such as one-time increases in administered prices or 
unfavorable weather conditions. 
2  For detailed surveys of inflation theories see, for example, Whitney (1982: 59-87), 
Frisch (1983), McCallum (1987), Beckerman (1992: 27-49) and Siklos (ed.) (1995: 3-
34). Humphrey (1998) specifically surveys the historical origins of cost-push inflation 
theories. 
3  For more information on the past and current Phillips-curve debates see Fischer (1983: 
20-150), Humphrey (1986: 91-133) and King (2000). 
4  The closed-economy IS-LM model and its open-economy version the F-M model are 
used particularly to analyze how changes in monetary and fiscal policy shift the 
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aggregate demand curve, and whether they affect the level of output and prices in the 
short- and long-run. The literature on the so-called open economy macroeconomics, or 
international macroeconomics, which is originating particularly from the F-M model, is 
listed on the web at: http://politics.ankara.edu.tr/~kibritci/oem.html.  
5  If we assume for simplicity that λ=1, then the equation (7) can be written as π
e=πt-1. Note 
that many economists consider this definition of backward-looking inflation 
expectations when they need a proxy of inflation inertia. From this point of view, 
inflation inertia can be interpreted as continuous upward shifts in both the aggregate 
demand and aggregate supply curves. That is to say, the actual inflation is caused by 
inflation expectations, and one expects inflation because it was experienced in the past. 
6  Subsequently, the one-way statistical causality running from money to prices in Cagan’s 
hyperinflation model is substituted by the assumption of two-way causality which 
allows to model a self-generating inflation process; see, e.g., Olivera (1967), Dutton 
(1971), Jacobs (1977) and Aghevli and Khan (1978). Notice that Siklos (ed.) (1995: 3-
34) discusses in detail the issue of the endogenity of money supply in hyperinflation 
periods with special reference to the rational-expectations revolution. Finally, for two 
interesting studies in the tradition of Cagan’s money-demand model, see Ball (1993) and 
Ruge-Murcia (1999) who analyze particularly the dynamics of high inflation in 
developing economies. 
7  For more information on the theoretical background of the structuralist inflation theory, 
see Kirkpatrick and Nixon (1976), Frisch (1983: 153-186), and Beckerman (1992: 32-
36). 
8 See  Edgren  et al. (1973), Aukrust (1977), and Calmfors (1977). 
9  The post-Keynesian arguments to explain inflation can be found mainly in studies of 
Michal Kalecki, Nicholas Kaldor, Paul Davidson, Hyman P. Minsky, and Sidney 
Weintraub. 
10  See, for example, Bresser-Preira and Nakano (1987), and Saad-Filho and Mollo (1999).  
11  See, for example, Montiel (1989), Calvo and Végh (1999), Fielding and Bleaney (2000), 
and the cited references therein. 
12  For more information on the discussions about the idea of “unpleasant monetarist 
arithmetic” presented by Sargent and Wallace  (1981), you may visit the following web 
page: http://politics.ankara.edu.tr/~kibritci/sargewall.html.  
13  The so-called “fiscal theory of price level” developed by Eric Leeper, Christopher A. 
Sims, John H. Cochrane, and particularly by Michael Woodford in the 1990s mainly 
argues that money is completely secondary in determining the price level, which is 
instead driven by the sequence of primary government deficits and surpluses. For more 
information on this theory and discussions about its validity, see Woodford (2000) and 
the references cited therein. 
14  For two detailed literature surveys on the sources of staggered prices, see Nadiri (1987) 
and Taylor (1998). Calvo (2000) is devoted particularly to discussion of the implication 
of price stickiness in emerging market economies. 
15  For a discussion of the origins and emergence of the NNS, see Goodfriend and King 
(1997), Woodford (1999), and King (2000). 
16  For a discussion of inflationary effects, which may result from temporary or persistent 
oil-prices shocks within the NNS framework, see Goodfriend and King (1997: 40-47). 
17  Goodfriend and King (1997: 50) state: “Economists working within the synthesis of the 
1960s were pessimistic about taming inflation, viewing inflation as having a momentum 
of its own and fluctuating with unmanageable shifts in the psychology of price setters”. 
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18 For more information on the emergence of the literature on new political 
macroeconomy, see Alesina et al. (1997) and Drazen (2000). 
19 Traditionally,  macroeconom(etr)ic models posit that monetary shocks have an effect on 
the economy only through a demand channel of transmission. In recent years, however, 
some economists argued that monetary shocks may also create important supply-side, or 
cost-side, effects on output and prices. For various theoretical models of monetary 
transmission mechanisms which allow monetary policy shocks to have both supply-side 
and demand-side effects, see Barth and Ramey (2001) and references cited therein. 
20  See Olivera (1967) and Tanzi (1977, 1978). 
21  This classification of the determinants of inflation has a broad similarity with Robert J. 
Gordon’s (1977, 1997) “triangle model of inflation” which is limited to the first three 
factors mentioned so far. 
22  Needless to say that the selection of studies here is unintentionally influenced by the 
availability of them. However, a large list of publications on inflation and disinflation in 
Turkey is available on the web at: http://politics.ankara.edu.tr/~kibritci/inflation/.  
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